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The Renewable Obligation scheme was implemented to promote renewable energy for 
electricity supply in the UK over 15 years from 2002 to 2017. Renewable Obligation 
Certificates (ROCs) were allocated to accredited generators for receiving additional revenues 
from selling those certificates to electricity suppliers. In particular, a recycling mechanism was 
employed in this scheme. That is, the penalties on missing ROCs from all suppliers are paid 
into the buy-out fund, which is then redistributed to suppliers in proportion to the number of 
ROCs they presented. This mechanism complicated the ROC trading in three aspects. First, the 
recycling mechanism induces strategic behaviour between suppliers in fulfilling the obligation 
of purchase of ROCs, leading to the equilibrium of a lower transfer payment from suppliers to 
generators, compared with the scenario without the mechanism. Secondly, under the recycling 
mechanism, the existence of vertical integration encourages upstream competition between 
generators, reducing ROC prices and the transfer payment. Thirdly, suppliers may strategically 
collude with each other to take the advantage of the recycling mechanism, but the existence of 
vertical integration weakens the collusion and prevents the worst case of nearly zero transfer 
payment.    
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As growing attention has been given to climate change and carbon emission, many 
countries have implemented policies to support renewable energy in their electricity sector. 
There are mainly price-based policies, such as feed-in tariffs or premiums, and quantity-based 
policies, such as quota systems using tradable green certificates. A large amount of literature 
has been devoted to the assessment of the effectiveness of these systems (Menanteau et al., 
2003; Meyer, 2003; Mitchell et al., 2006; Butler and Neuhoff, 2008; Fouquet and Johansson, 
2008; Jacobsson et al., 2009; Haas et al., 2011; Ragwitz and Steinhilber, 2014; Winkler et al., 
2016; Nicolini and Tavoni, 2017; Schallenberg-Rodriguez, 2017). 
On one end of the spectrum, in a fixed feed-in tariff (FIT) system, electricity generators 
receive a fixed tariff for each unit of electricity they produce, and distribution network operators 
are obliged to accept this output to their network. This system is suitable for small-scale 
renewable and low-carbon electricity generation projects, such as the Feed-In Tariffs 
introduced in April 2010 in the UK for renewable sources producing up to 5 MW power.2 A 
more market-oriented variant of the FIT is known as the feed-in premium (FIP) system that has 
an extra margin (called the premium) added to the market price of electricity generators receive 
from the market. In both systems, the tariff or premium is usually set for a number of years, to 
provide the price security to investors for a substantial part of the project lifetime. The feed-in 
premium (FIP) system is in use in most European countries, such as Germany, Denmark, and 
Spain, in combination with other support instruments or as the main support system (Hvelplund, 
2001; Lauber and Mez, 2004; Mitchell et al., 2006; del Río and Gual, 2007; Lipp, 2007; Meyer, 
2007; del Río González, 2008; Lesser and Su, 2008; Munksgaard and Morthorst, 2008; Toke 
et al., 2008; Couture and Gagnon, 2010; Mabee et al., 2012; Schallenberg-Rodriguez and Haas, 
2012; Jenner et al., 2013; Antweiler, 2017; May, 2017).  
On the other end, in a quota system, electricity suppliers are required to purchase 
certificates from generators up to a certain percentage of their total sales of electricity. 
Renewable electricity generators sell their electricity in the market, but they receive additional 
revenues from selling certificates awarded by the regulator. The concept of green certificates 
comes from the Renewable Portfolio Standard, which is a state-mandated program in the United 
States that establishes the percentage of the state’s overall electricity that must come from 
renewable energy (Berry and Jaccard, 2001; Kydes, 2007; Barbose et al., 2015; Upton and 
Snyder, 2017; Young and Bistline, 2018). Similar policies were also implemented in Sweden 
(Wang, 2006; Jacobsson, 2008; Oikonomou and Mundaca, 2008; Jacobsson et al., 2009; Bergek 
and Jacobsson, 2010), Belgium (Jacobsson et al., 2009; Verbruggen, 2009), Australia (MacGill, 
2010), and Netherlands (Oikonomou and Mundaca, 2008). 
As a case of the quota system, the Renewable Obligation (RO) scheme implemented in 
Great Britain in 2002 was first seen in European countries.3 Renewable generators received 
Renewable Obligation Certificates (ROCs) from the regulator but they do not have priority 
access to the market and can only export their output if they have a contract with suppliers.   
The RO scheme was designed to promote the supply of renewable electricity through the market, 
                                                     
2 In the Feed-In Tariffs scheme, owners of an eligible renewable electricity system, such as solar PV, a wind or hydro 
turbine, or micro CHP, receive payments for every kilowatt-hour they generate. Additional payment is awarded if 
the owner exports the surplus electricity back to the electricity grid (effectively selling that electricity to the energy 
supply company). The tariffs will be fixed (adjusted for inflation) for 20 years for almost all of the systems. 
3 The RO scheme was first implemented in England, Wales, and Scotland in 2002/03, and then extended to Northern 
Ireland from 2005/06.  
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where both electricity and ROCs are traded between generators and suppliers. Market 
competition is expected to form the price of ROCs that can affect the transfer payment from 
suppliers to generators. The RO scheme in the UK was aimed at promoting investment in 
renewable technology more competitively, rather than providing the investors with a risk-free 
award or fixed financial support, which is fundamentally different from the FIT system.  With 
the RO scheme, the investors or generators are expected to gain more if their invested renewable 
projects or technologies can be more cost-efficient.  (Morthorst, 2000; Bergek and Jacobsson, 
2010; Darmani et al., 2016; Schallenberg-Rodriguez, 2017; Lancker and Quaas, 2019).  
The effectiveness of the RO has been assessed by existing literature and its design has 
been criticised for its lack of effectiveness as a mechanism for encouraging the deployment of 
renewable projects in its early years (Toke, 2007; Jacobsson et al., 2009; Wood and Dow, 2011; 
Woodman and Mitchell, 2011). The main problem it created for the development of renewable 
projects in the UK was the uncertainty associated with the price and the quantity. The price of 
certificates was not guaranteed, and the support level is not differentiated, meaning that the rate 
of returns on an investment in a renewable project was not predictable and flat against different 
renewable technologies at different costs of investment. On one hand, for any renewable project, 
the uncertainties of investment increase costs in financing new projects due to higher risk and 
thus discourage investments in renewable technologies; on the other hand, the flat support 
discouraged investments in more expensive technologies. For example, in 2009, the proportion 
of electricity generated from wind is only 2.03%, mainly on cheaper onshore projects (DBEIS). 
However, the introduction of banding and guaranteed headroom in 2009/10 helped intensify 
incentives for investments in renewable projects. The banding introduced different levels of 
support for different technologies according to their investment costs and associated risk (DTI, 
2007), and the headroom increases the number of certificates imposed on suppliers to purchase. 
These two amendments unlocked the potential to build large wind farms, expensive offshore 
projects in particular.4,5 In 2018, the proportion of electricity generated from wind increased to 
18.04% (9.93% from offshore and 8.11% from onshore respectively). Meanwhile, the cost of 
this scheme increased from £228 million in 2002/03 to £5.3 billion in 2017/18, which was 
funded via customers’ energy bills, but it remains unknown that how this financial support was 
distributed among suppliers and generators. After running over 15 years, the Renewables 
Obligation was closed to new generators in March 2017 and was replaced by Contracts for 
Difference, in which the government had a better control over the cost of supporting renewable 
energy, and the generators gained a higher certainty about the price they would receive for their 
output (Bunn and Yusupov, 2015). 6  
The existing assessment of RO has been mainly based on policy arguments and 
performance outcomes, few theoretical models have been built up to capture the behaviour of 
players in the RO scheme with a recycling mechanism. Zhou (2012) constructed a model 
showing that generators can restrict the sales of the certificates to maximise its profits but 
without addressing the role of suppliers in affecting sales and price of the certificates. In 
contrast, our paper makes the first attempt to discuss the interaction between suppliers and 
                                                     
4 Banding allows for various support levels on technologies with different maturity. For example, from 2016/17, 
onshore wind projects receive 0.9 ROCs/MWh while offshore wind projects receive 1.8 ROCs/MWh. The highest 
value was awarded to small wave and tidal stream projects (under 30 MW) as 5 ROCs/MWh. (Renewables 
Obligation banding levels: 2013-17, Ofgem).  
5 Guaranteed headroom ensures that the demand for ROC is greater than its supply. For example, for 2018/19, the 
number of ROC required is 10 percent higher than the number of ROC issued. (Calculating the Level of the 
Renewables Obligation for 2018/19, Ofgem) 
6 After the closure of RO to new generators in 2017, accredited generators will continue to receive support for the 
20-year period according to their contracts. 
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generators in trading the certificates, and interaction between suppliers that would be crucial in 
determining the number and price of ROCs and the size of transfer payment from suppliers to 
generators. In our theoretical analysis, we find that the introduction of a recycling mechanism 
in the RO scheme induces strategic behaviour between suppliers, resulting in multiple equilibria 
that exist upon different prices of ROCs. By taking suppliers’ behaviour into account, the 
generator can choose a specific price of ROCs that produces the maximum transfer payment 
from the supplier, while induces the supplier to meet its full obligation of ROCs required. 
However, compared with the scenario without the recycling mechanism, this mechanism 
produces a lower transfer payment due to the strategic behaviour between suppliers it caused.  
Our model further explains that the ROC price and the transfer payment depends also 
on the relative bargaining powers between suppliers and generators. Both the ROC price and 
the transfer payment will decline if suppliers have stronger bargaining power in negotiation for 
the price of ROCs. Furthermore, under the recycling mechanism, the existence of vertical 
integration encourages competition between generators, leading to a lower price of ROC and 
transfer payment. Finally, suppliers may collude with each other in choosing their fulfilment of 
the obligation in purchasing ROCs from generators, but the collusion can be weakened by the 
vertical integration of a generator with a supplier that pursues different interests from other 
independent suppliers. The competition between integrated and independent suppliers is 
conducive to prevent suppliers from jointly abusing the recycling mechanism and minimising 
the transfer payment.   
The paper will be constructed in the following way. Section 2 briefly explains the 
Renewable Obligation scheme. Section 3 constructs a theoretical model to explore the RO 
scheme with a recycling mechanism and Section 4 provides further analysis. Section 5 
concludes the paper.   
 
2. The Renewable Obligation in the UK 
 
The Renewables Obligation (RO) scheme came into effect in 2002 and had been the 
main support mechanism for large-scale renewable electricity projects in the UK. The 
Renewable Obligation requires suppliers to supply a certain proportion of their total sales of 
electricity from renewable sources, by presenting an adequate number of ROCs. Partially, due 
to the support from the RO scheme, the proportion of electricity generated from renewable 
sources (hydro, wind, solar, and bioenergy) increased from 3.02% in 2002 to 33.27% in 2018 
(DBEIS). 
At the beginning of each reporting year, the regulator allocates a fixed number of 
Renewables Obligation Certificates (ROCs) to accredit renewable generators according to their 
expected electricity output and set up the obligation levels for electricity suppliers. 7  The 
required number of ROCs for a particular supplier is the product of its sales of electricity and 
the obligation level.8 During the year, suppliers purchase ROCs from renewable electricity 
generators, and the price of ROCs is negotiated between them. ROCs can be attached to the 
electricity sold by renewable generators or can be sold separately.  
                                                     
7 The obligation level set by the government has increased gradually, from 0.03 ROC per MWh in 2002-03 to 0.468 
ROC per MWh in 2017-18, for England, Wales, and Scotland.   
8 For example, if a supplier’s annual sales of electricity are 1,000 MWh and the obligation level is 0.468 ROC per 
MWh, then the required number of ROCs is 1,000 ∙ 0.468 = 468 for this supplier.  
5 
 
At the end of a reporting year, suppliers use their ROCs to demonstrate that they have 
fulfilled their obligation. If suppliers fail to present a sufficient number of ROCs, they must pay 
a penalty, known as the buyout price, for each ROC missed. One feature of the RO scheme 
implemented in the UK is the recycling mechanism, that is, the penalties from all suppliers are 
paid into the buyout fund, which is then redistributed back to suppliers in proportion to the 
number of ROCs they presented, after deducting the System Operator’s administration costs. 
The redistribution payment entitled by each ROC presented is referred to as the recycle value. 
 
3. A theoretical model 
 
In this section, we construct a theoretical model to understand the transfer payment 
from suppliers to generators in the RO scheme with the recycling mechanism. Briefly, our 
theoretical model is constructed strategically and vertically on the basis of suppliers choosing 
the quantity of ROCs in response to a given ROC price under the recycling mechanism for 
maximizing their own gains. Given such Nash-Cournot behaviour of suppliers in choosing 
ROCs, generators set up a price of ROCs for maximizing their own gains.  
     
3.1 Suppliers 
 
Assume that there are a number of electricity suppliers in the market. Consider a 
supplier 𝑖 with 𝑞𝑖  as its annual supply of electricity in MWh (megawatt hour), and 𝛼 as an 
obligation level set by the regulator, then the required ROCs for supplier 𝑖 is 𝛼𝑞𝑖. Let 𝑅𝑖 be the 
number of ROCs presented, then the number of ROCs missed is (𝛼𝑞𝑖 − 𝑅𝑖). Let 𝑓 be the 
buyout price per ROC missed set by the regulator, then the penalty for the supplier 𝑖  is 
(𝛼𝑞𝑖 − 𝑅𝑖)𝑓, which is paid into the buyout fund.  
 
3.1.1 The supplier’s profit maximisation problem 
 
The supplier 𝑖’s profit function can be written as   
𝜋𝑖 = (𝑝
𝑒 − 𝑝𝑤)𝑞𝑖 − 𝑝
𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑅𝑖 − (𝛼𝑞𝑖 − 𝑅𝑖)𝑓 +  𝑅𝑖𝐸𝑖(𝑟) (1) 
where (𝑝𝑒 − 𝑝𝑤)𝑞𝑖  is the profit from selling electricity to end-users, where 𝑝
𝑒  is the retail 
electricity price, 𝑝𝑤 is the wholesale electricity price, 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐 is the price of ROC that suppliers 
paid to generators, 𝑅𝑖 is the number of ROCs purchased and presented by supplier 𝑖, 𝑝
𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑅𝑖 is 
the transfer payment from supplier 𝑖 to generators, (𝛼𝑞𝑖 − 𝑅𝑖)𝑓 is the penalty payment paid 
into the buyout fund. For each ROC presented, the supplier receives a recycle value 𝑟 for it. 
The recycle value is unknown until the end of the period, i.e., after all suppliers present their 
ROCs and pay their penalties, so 𝑅𝑖𝐸𝑖(𝑟) is the expected redistribution payment based on the 
expected recycle value 𝐸𝑖(𝑟). The profit function can be rewritten as 
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑚𝑞𝑖 − (𝑓 + 𝑟
𝑛)𝑅𝑖 − (𝛼𝑞𝑖 − 𝑅𝑖)𝑓 +  𝑅𝑖𝐸𝑖(𝑟) (2) 
where 𝑚 = 𝑝𝑒 − 𝑝𝑤 denotes the profit margin of electricity sales. The supplier is willing to 
pay a ROC price that includes two terms, (𝑓 + 𝑟𝑛), where 𝑓 is the penalty (the buyout price) 
that the supplier needs to pay for every ROC missed, and 𝑟𝑛 is a premium. This premium may 
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reflect the recycle value, 𝑟, received by the supplier for each ROC presented at the end of the 
period. In reality, the premium 𝑟𝑛 is negotiated between suppliers and generators.  
As it has been a rising concern on climate change, suppliers with a stronger 
commitment to green energy are more likely to be welcomed by the public. An assumption we 
make here is that electricity will be sold by the supplier 𝑖 in the next period is positively related 




> 0 (3) 
where one more unit of ROCs presented in this period leads to 𝑠𝑖 MWh increase in electricity 
to be sold by the supplier next period. Here we refer 𝑚𝑠𝑖  as the future marginal benefits from 
presenting additional ROCs in the present period, assuming that the retail electricity price and 
the wholesale electricity price are static over time.  
 
3.1.2 The determination of the recycle value 
 
Here we show how the recycle value is determined. The penalty from each supplier is 
paid into a buyout fund, which is then redistributed to suppliers in proportion to the number of 
ROCs they presented. The recycle value is the redistribution of penalty payment to each ROC 
presented by a supplier. By assuming the System Operator’s administration cost is zero, the 











≥ 0 (4) 
where 𝑛 is the number of suppliers, 𝑄 is the total electricity sold by all suppliers, 𝑄 = ∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 , 
and 𝑅 is the total ROCs presented.9  As suppliers will not present more ROCs than required, 
𝑅 ≤ 𝛼𝑄, the recycle value is no less than zero, 𝑟 ≥ 0. For simplicity, we consider a case with 
two suppliers, Supplier 1 and Supplier 2. The recycle value, 𝑟, becomes 
𝑟 =






− 𝑓 (5𝑏) 







< 0  ↔   𝑅1 ↑→ 𝑟 ↓. (6)  
Equation (6) suggests that when the number of ROCs presented by Supplier 2, 𝑅2, remains the 
same, an increase in the number of ROCs presented by Supplier 1, 𝑅1, reduces the recycle value, 
                                                     
9 By rearranging the equation, the redistribution payment received by a supplier is in proportion to the number of 
ROCs it presented, 𝑟𝑅𝑖 =
𝑅𝑖
𝑅
(𝛼𝑄 − 𝑅)𝑓. That means, when other things remain the same, a supplier will receive 
back a higher proportion of the total penalty if it presents more ROCs.  
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𝑟. This is because a higher 𝑅1 reduces the total penalty (numerator) but increases the total 
number of ROCs presented (denominator) in Equation (5a).10  
 
3.1.3 Supplier 1’s profit maximisation in Choosing ROCs  
 
After knowing how the recycle value 𝑟 is determined in Equation (5b), Supplier 1 




− 𝑓 (7) 
Where 𝐸1(𝑟) is the recycle value expected by Supplier 1, which depends on Supplier 1’s 
expectation of Supplier 2’s presented number of ROCs. After substituting 𝐸1(𝑟) in Equation 
(2), Supplier 1’s profit function becomes 
𝜋1 = 𝑚𝑄1 − (𝑓 + 𝑟
𝑛)𝑅1 − (𝛼𝑞1 − 𝑅1)𝑓 + 𝑅1 [
𝛼𝑄𝑓
𝑅1 + 𝐸1(𝑅2)
− 𝑓] (8) 
By choosing a number of ROCs to maximise profits of Supplier 1, we take the first derivative 
with respect to the number of ROCs presented by Supplier 1, 𝑅1, is 
𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝑅1






where the first term in Equation (9) is the future marginal benefit, the second term is the 
marginal cost, and the last term is the marginal benefit from redistribution. When the ROC price 
is greater than the future marginal benefit, 
 𝑓 + 𝑟𝑛 > 𝑚𝑠1 (10) 




𝑓 + 𝑟𝑛 − 𝑚𝑠1
− 𝐸1(𝑅2) (11) 
The (11) is the optimal number of ROCs presented by Supplier 1 that maximises its profit.11 
We refer it to as a response function as it depends on the expectation of Supplier 2’s presented 
number of ROCs. Inequality (10) is the condition that induces strategic behaviour between 
suppliers.12  
If Inequality (10) is not met, that is, 𝑓 + 𝑟𝑛 ≤ 𝑚𝑠1, suppliers will simply purchase all 
ROCs required as the marginal cost is less than the future marginal benefit.13 From generators’ 
point of view, given that all ROCs allocated or issued by the government are fixed, they have 
no motivation to agree on a price lower than 𝑚𝑠1, as no additional ROCs can be sold so a lower 
price leads to a lower transfer payment from suppliers.  
                                                     






3 > 0, showing that the recycle value is a concave up, 
decreasing function with 𝑅1. 
11 The turning point is a maximum as the second derivative is 
𝜕2(𝜋1)
𝜕(𝑅1)
2 = −2𝛼𝑄𝐸1(𝑅2)𝑓(𝑅1 + 𝐸1(𝑅2))
−3
< 0. 
12 It is also the pre-condition for the square root calculation,  
𝛼𝑄𝑓𝐸1(𝑅2)
𝑓+𝑟𝑛−𝑚𝛾1
> 0 → 𝑓 + 𝑟𝑛 > 𝑚𝛾1  → 𝑝
𝑟𝑜𝑐 > 𝑚𝛾1. 




> 0, an increase in the presented number of ROCs by Supplier 1 always leads to a 
higher profit.  
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The response function in Equation (11) suggests that Supplier 1’s profit does not 
always move towards the same direction with its presented number of ROCs. When 𝑅1 is lower 
than the optimal level, a higher 𝑅1 increases profit; when 𝑅1 is higher than the optimal level, a 
















< 0 (12𝑏) 
This suggests that presenting all ROCs required may not be necessarily the optimal strategy, as 
the optimal number of ROCs that maximises Supplier 1’s profit depends on the number of 
ROCs presented by Supplier 2.  
 
3.1.4 Supplier 2’s profit maximisation in choosing ROCs   
 
Supplier 2 has a similar profit function with Supplier 1,  
𝜋2 = (𝑝
𝑒 − 𝑝𝑤)𝑞2 − 𝑝
𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑅2 − (𝛼𝑞2 − 𝑅2)𝑓 +  𝑅2𝐸2(𝑟) (13) 
in which Supplier 2’s expected recycle value depends on its expectation of Supplier 1’s 




− 𝑓 (14) 





𝑓 + 𝑟𝑛 − 𝑚𝑠2
− 𝐸2(𝑅1) (15) 
which depends on its expectation of Supplier 1’s presented number of ROCs. 
 
3.1.5 A symmetric case under perfect information 
 
The expected numbers of ROCs presented, 𝐸2(𝑅1) and 𝐸1(𝑅2), are included in these 
response functions. To solve the equilibrium, we assume that the presented numbers are 
consistent with expectations, 
𝐸2(𝑅1) = 𝑅1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸1(𝑅2) = 𝑅2 (16) 
and assume that these two suppliers are identical, so the future marginal benefits are the same, 
𝑚𝑠1 = 𝑚𝑠2 = 𝑚𝑠 (17) 
Then the two response functions become 
𝑅1 = √
𝛼𝑄𝑅2𝑓
𝑓 + 𝑟𝑛 − 𝑚𝑠
− 𝑅2  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑅2 = √
𝛼𝑄𝑅1𝑓
𝑓 + 𝑟𝑛 − 𝑚𝑠
− 𝑅1 (18) 
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The intersection point of these two response functions solves the equilibrium values of 𝑅1 and 





4(𝑓 + 𝑟𝑛 − 𝑚𝑠)
(19)   





2(𝑓 + 𝑟𝑛 − 𝑚𝑠)
(20) 
At the equilibrium, the presented number of ROCs depends on the obligation level 𝛼, the total 
electricity sold by two suppliers 𝑄, the future marginal benefit 𝑚𝑠, the buyout price 𝑓, and the 
premium 𝑟𝑛. In our following analysis, we assume that only varying variable is the premium 
𝑟𝑛, which is negotiated between generators and suppliers. Equation (20) suggests that there are 




< 0  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛  𝑅𝑒 < ?̅? (21) 
where ?̅?  is the number of ROCs issued or allocated by the government. The (21) or (20) 
suggests that a higher (lower) premium reduces (increases) the number of ROCs presented at 
the equilibrium and so the percentage of obligation met by suppliers.14 As the number of ROC 
presented is constrained by ?̅?, the first derivative (21) does not hold anymore when 𝑅𝑒 = ?̅?. 












Figure 1: The obligation met by suppliers. Figure 1 shows the obligation met by suppliers given the ROC price. 






                                                     
14 The second derivative is 
𝜕2(𝑅𝑒)
𝜕(𝑟𝑛)2
= 𝛼𝑄𝑓(𝑓 + 𝑟𝑛 − 𝑚𝛾)−3 > 0, suggesting that 𝑅𝑒  is a concave up, decreasing 









3.2 The generator 
 
In reality, the premium (and then the ROC price) is negotiated between suppliers and 
generators. As the RO scheme is designed to help renewable generators receive an additional 
transfer payment from suppliers, we first assume that a single renewable generator sets up a 
price in the ROC market to explore the best possible outcome for itself. Previous analysis shows 
that the number of ROCs presented by suppliers depends on the premium (and then the ROC 
price), the question now becomes how the ROC price is set by the generator.  
Consider that this renewable electricity generator has an estimated annual maximum 
output 𝑄𝑐 MWh, calculated from its capacity and the load factor. In the Renewable Obligation 
scheme, after becoming an accredited station, the regulator allocates ?̅? = 𝛽𝑄𝑐 for ROCs to this 
generator. The support level 𝛽  indicates the number of ROCs allocated to each MWh it 
generates. This parameter remained at one, 𝛽 = 1, from 2002-03 to 2008-09 for all types of 
technology. After the introduction of banding, it varies for technologies depending upon their 
relative maturity, development cost and associated risk (DTI, 2007). 
 
3.2.1 The generator’s profit maximisation problem 
 
The generator’s profits include two components, i.e., the profit from selling electricity, 
Π𝑠, and the transfer payment from selling ROCs, Π𝑟𝑜𝑐. The wholesale electricity price 𝑝𝑤 is 
assumed as given to be the same for both the renewable generator and traditional generators in 
the competitive electricity wholesale market. Let 𝑄𝑔 be the actual quantity of electricity the 
renewable generator sold and 𝑅 be the quantity of ROC sold. The generator’s profits become  
Π = Π𝑠 + Π𝑟𝑜𝑐 = (𝑝𝑤 − 𝑐)𝑄𝑔 + 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑅 = (𝑝𝑤 − 𝑐)𝑄𝑔 + (𝑓 + 𝑟𝑛)𝑅 (22) 
 subject to the constraint of availability of ROCs, 
𝑅 ≤ ?̅? = 𝛽𝑄𝑐 (23) 
where 𝑐 is the constant marginal cost of producing green electricity, 𝛽𝑄𝑐  is the number of 
ROCs allocated to the generator. We assume that the number of ROCs allocated is equal to the 
number of ROCs required, ?̅? = 𝛼𝑄. This assumption helps focus on the strategic behaviour 
between suppliers in our model. When the allocated number is greater than the required number, 
?̅? > 𝛼𝑄, after suppliers have fully fulfilled their obligation, 𝛼𝑄, and there is no demand for the 
rest of ROCs, ?̅? − 𝛼𝑄, leading to a sudden collapse of ROCs price. In the UK, the introduction 
of the guaranteed headroom in 2009-10 removed this possibility and helped reduce the 
uncertainty associated with the price.15    
Assume that the generator knows the strategic behaviour between suppliers in choosing 
ROCs and understand that the quantity of ROCs demanded depends on the premium, and sales 
of renewable electricity are linked to sales of ROCs after taking Equation (20) into account, the 
generator will maximise profits below,  
Π = (𝑝𝑤 − 𝑐)𝑄𝑔(𝑅(𝑟𝑛)) + (𝑓 + 𝑟𝑛)
𝛼𝑄𝑓
2(𝑓 + 𝑟𝑛 − 𝑚𝑠)
(24) 
                                                     
15 A more complicated case arises when the allocated number is less than the required number, ?̅? < 𝛼𝑄. In this case, 
the recycling mechanism is also responsible for refunding the unjustified penalty. Nonetheless, the problem of 
strategic behaviour that leads to a lower transfer payment discussed in the paper remains.  
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by taking the first derivative with respect to the premium 𝑟𝑛 which gives,  
𝜕Π
𝜕𝑟𝑛








(𝑓 + 𝑟𝑛 − 𝑚𝑠)−2 < 0  when  𝑅 < ?̅? (25) 
The first term is the product of the positive marginal impact of the number of ROCs 
sold on the sales of renewable electricity, 𝜕𝑄𝑔/𝜕𝑅 > 0, and the negative marginal impact of 
the premium on the number of ROCs sold, 𝜕𝑅/𝜕𝑟𝑛 < 0. 16 The second term is the negative 
marginal impact of the premium on the transfer payment. As both terms are negative, this first 
derivative shown in (25) is less than zero, suggesting that a lower premium 𝑟𝑛 leads to a higher 
profit to the generator from selling electricity and ROCs.  
 
3.3 The ROC price, compliance, and the transfer payment  
3.3.1 The transfer payment and the premium 
 
In this section, we explore the relationship between the ROC price and the transfer 
payment from suppliers to the generator. In the first phase, before all of the allocated ROCs are 
sold, the number of ROCs sold depends on the premium. Taking Equation (20) into account, 
the transfer payment to the generator from selling ROCs is  
Π𝑟𝑜𝑐 = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑅 = (𝑓 + 𝑟𝑛)
𝛼𝑄𝑓
2(𝑓 + 𝑟𝑛 − 𝑚𝑠)
  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛  𝑅 < ?̅? (26) 





2(𝑓 + 𝑟𝑛 − 𝑚𝑠)2
< 0  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛  𝑅 < ?̅? (27) 
where (27) suggests that a lower premium will lead to a higher transfer payment from suppliers 
to the generator.17 However, as the number of ROCs allocated is fixed for suppliers to purchase,   
when all of the allocated ROCs are sold, the transfer payment becomes 
Π𝑟𝑜𝑐 = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐?̅? = (𝑓 + 𝑟𝑛)?̅?  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛  𝑅 = ?̅? (28) 
and its first derivative is 
𝜕Π𝑟𝑜𝑐
𝜕𝑟𝑛
= ?̅? > 0  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛  𝑅 = ?̅? (29) 
which suggests that a decline in the premium will decrease the transfer payment to the generator. 




                                                     
16 Due to the competitiveness in the electricity wholesale market, we assume that the sale of electricity by the 
renewable generator positively depends on the number of ROCs it sells, 𝜕𝑄𝑔/𝜕𝑅 > 0.  This assumption implies that 
the generator sells more electricity when more ROC is sold. In reality, the renewable generator can sell its electricity 
and ROCs separately. In this case, we may have 𝜕𝑄𝑔/𝜕𝑅 = 0, but our conclusion is not affected, as the first 
derivative (25) is still negative.  






> 0, suggesting that the function of transfer 















Figure 2: The transfer payment from suppliers to the generator via selling ROCs. Figure 2 shows the transfer 
payment from suppliers to the generator affected by  ROC prices. The straight line is determined by the linear relation 
between the transfer payment and the ROC price after all ROC is sold. The concave up, decreasing curve is 
determined by the signs of the first derivative and second derivative of Equation (26). 
 
3.3.2 The maximum transfer payment 
 
We have shown that the fulfilment of the obligation increases when the premium (or 
the ROC price) declines until the obligation is fully met. Therefore, we first find the ROC price 
that can affect the delivery of the full obligation fulfilment. In this case, the total presented 
number of ROCs is equal to the total required number of ROCs, 𝛼𝑄, and it is shared equally by 
those two identical suppliers,  






Substitute (30) into Equation (19) gives,  
𝛼𝑄𝑓





Then the ROC price is solved as 
(𝑓 + 𝑟𝑛) = 𝑚𝑠 +
𝑓
2




Equation (32) suggests that the obligation is fully met when the ROC price is (𝑚𝑠 + 𝑓/2), as 
shown in Figure 3. On the one hand, any lower ROC price does not increase the number of 
ROCs presented as all ROCs have been sold. On the other hand, any higher ROC price reduces 
both the number of ROCs sold and the percentage of obligation met by suppliers according to 






















Figure 3: The obligation met by suppliers. Figure 3 shows the obligation met by suppliers given the ROC price. 
The obligation is fully met when the ROC price is (𝑚𝑠 + 𝑓/2) or less. Any higher ROC price will reduce the number 
of ROC presented. For example, when the ROC price is (𝑚𝑠 + 𝑓), the obligation is half met.  
 
The transfer payment from suppliers to the generator at the ROC price of (32) is,  
Π𝑟𝑜𝑐 = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑅 = (𝑚𝑠 +
𝑓
2
) 𝛼𝑄 (33) 
which is the maximum transfer payment from the supplier to the generator in the RO scheme 
with the recycling mechanism, shown as point A in Figure 4. On the one hand, the generator 
has no motivation to set a lower ROC price to receive a lower transfer payment as no additional 
ROCs can be sold. On the other hand, as suggested by the first derivative (27), any higher ROC 
price reduces the number of ROC sold and leads to a lower transfer payment. In Section 4.1, 













Figure 4: The transfer payment from suppliers to the generator via selling ROCs. Figure 4 shows the transfer 
payment from suppliers to the generator given the ROC price. The transfer payment is maximised when the ROC 
price is at (𝑚𝑠 + 𝑓/2) and the obligation is fully met. Any lower ROC price leads to a lower transfer payment as no 
more ROCs can be sold. Any higher ROC price leads to a lower transfer payment as suppliers present less ROCs. 















































Here we illustrate an example of a higher ROC price. Consider the generator sets a 
higher ROC price at (𝑚𝑠 + 𝑓), then, according to Equation (20), the total presented number of 
ROCs is  
𝑅𝑒 =
𝛼𝑄𝑓










which shows that half of the required number of ROCs, 𝛼𝑄/2, is shared by those two identical 
suppliers. Therefore, the obligation is half met when the ROC price is (𝑚𝑠 + 𝑓), greater than 
the price for the full obligation fulfilment. The transfer payment in this case is  




which is less than the transfer payment under the full obligation fulfilment, and it is shown at 
point H in Figure 4. At this point, the generator is willing to start to consider reducing the 
premium (and thus the ROC price) to sell more ROCs until all required ROCs are sold, moving 
back towards point A.  
Another point shown in Figure 4 is that the transfer payment at point H is 
(𝑚𝑠 + 𝑓)𝛼𝑄/2, but there is another point L also produces the same amount of transfer payment, 
indicating suppliers to choose different fulfilments of obligation in response to different prices 
of ROCs. At point L, the ROC price is lower than (𝑚𝑠 + 𝑓)/2, and then all required number 
of ROCs are sold, contrasting to only half of the obligation met at point H. Therefore, we 
suggest that both the generator and suppliers should prefer point L, instead of point H, as the 
generator benefits from higher sales of electricity which may be related to the number of ROC 




4.1 A model without the recycling mechanism 
 
In previous sections, we have shown the transfer payment when there is a recycling 
mechanism. In this section, we discuss the suppliers’ behaviour when there is no recycling 
mechanism and then compare the results of these two scenarios.  
In the scenario without the recycling mechanism, where removes the term of 
redistribution payment from Equation (2), but still hold penalty 𝑓 imposed on each ROC missed 
by suppliers, then the supplier’s profit function becomes, 
𝜋𝑖
′ = 𝑚𝑞𝑖 − (𝑓 + 𝑟
𝑛)𝑅𝑖 − (𝛼𝑞𝑖 − 𝑅𝑖)𝑓 (36) 




= 𝑚𝑠𝑖 − 𝑟
𝑛 (37) 
which implies that  
𝑟𝑛 > 𝑚𝑠𝑖  𝑜𝑟  𝑝
𝑟𝑜𝑐 > 𝑚𝑠𝑖 + 𝑓 ↔  𝑅1 = 0 (38𝑎) 
𝑟𝑛 = 𝑚𝑠𝑖  𝑜𝑟  𝑝
𝑟𝑜𝑐 = 𝑚𝑠𝑖 + 𝑓 ↔  𝑅1 = 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 (38𝑏) 
𝑟𝑛 < 𝑚𝑠𝑖  𝑜𝑟  𝑝
𝑟𝑜𝑐 < 𝑚𝑠𝑖 + 𝑓 ↔  𝑅1 = 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 (38𝑐) 
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That is, suppliers will not purchase any ROCs if the premium is greater than the future 
benefit, but purchase all ROC required when the premium is less than the future benefit. 
Therefore, the generator will choose a ROC price that is marginally lower than the sum of the 
future benefit and the buyout price to encourage suppliers to purchase all ROC required, thus 
the transfer payment from suppliers to the generator is 
(Π𝑟𝑜𝑐)′ ≈ (𝑚𝑠 + 𝑓)𝛼𝑄 (39) 
where 𝑚𝑠 denotes the future marginal benefits. The (39) implies that the transfer payment 
without the recycling mechanism is higher than the maximum transfer payment under the 
recycling mechanism, (𝑚𝑠 + 𝑓/2)𝛼𝑄, shown in the (33). This is because of the ROC price, 
(𝑚𝑠 + 𝑓), can lead to the full obligation fulfilment without the recycling mechanism in this 
scenario but only a half fulfilment of the obligation met in the scenario with the recycling 
mechanism due to the strategic behaviour between suppliers, as shown in Figure 4 and Equation 
(35). Therefore, the recycling mechanism may be introduced to incentivise suppliers to meet 
their obligation, but it unintentionally leads to a lower transfer payments from suppliers to 
generators.18  
 
4.2 The transfer payment under different bargaining powers 
 
So far, we assume that the generator has a price-setting power to sell ROCs at a price 
of (𝑚𝑠 + 𝑓/2) for achieving the maximum transfer payment of (𝑚𝑠 + 𝑓/2)𝛼𝑄 from suppliers 
to itself. In reality, the premium (or the ROC price) is negotiated between suppliers and 
generators, and the final outcome depends on their bargaining powers. From the discussion on 
Equation (10), the generator will not agree on any price lower than 𝑚𝑠, as all suppliers will 
purchase and present all ROC required at this ROC price. From the discussion on Equation (32), 
the generator will not set any ROC price higher than (𝑚𝑠 + 𝑓/2), as a higher price reduces the 
number of ROCs bought and so leads to a lower transfer payment. Therefore, the ROC price is 
in a range from 𝑚𝑠 to (𝑚𝑠 + 𝑓/2), and obligation is always fully met, as shown in Figure 5. 













                                                     
18 According to the regulator’s report, the total cost to support the RO scheme is approximated as (𝑓 + 𝑟)𝛼𝑄. A 















Figure 5: The obligation met by suppliers. Figure 5 shows the obligation met by suppliers given the ROC price. 
The final outcome depends on the bargaining powers between the generator and suppliers. As shown by the bolded 
line, the ROC price has a range from 𝑚𝑠 to (𝑚𝑠 + 𝑓/2), while the obligation is always fully met.  
 











Figure 6: The transfer payment from suppliers to the generator via selling ROCs. Figure 6 shows the transfer 
payment from suppliers to the generator given the ROC price. The final outcome depends on the bargaining powers 
between the generator and suppliers. As shown by the bolded line, the ROC price has a range from 𝑚s to (𝑚𝑠 + 𝑓/2) 
and the transfer payment has a range from 𝑚𝑠𝛼𝑄 to (𝑚𝑠 + 𝑓/2)𝛼𝑄, while the obligation is always fully met.  
 
 
When the generator is dominant in bargaining, the equilibrium is achieved at point A, at which 
the maximum transfer payment is achieved. In contrast, when suppliers are dominant in 
bargaining, the equilibrium is reached at point B, at which the minimum transfer payment is 
delivered. The generator’s bargaining power shall be high if there is only one generator on the 
market. If there is more than one generator on the market, we argue that the ROC trading market 
is still in favour of the generators to bargain or negotiate with suppliers. This is because, first, 
the headroom mechanism creates a stronger favour for generators to bargain as the mechanism 
introduces more demand than supply in trading ROCs. Secondly, the recent change in public 



































more environmental-friendly, raising further demand for ROCs. Thirdly, the gradual decline in 
the cost of renewable energy reduces the generator’s dependence on the transfer payment, 
which previously was crucial for the generator’s economic viability. Fourthly, the increasing 
competition in the electricity retail sector reduces the probability of cooperation between 
suppliers aiming to negotiate for a lower ROC price.  
 
 
4.3 The strategic competition under the recycling mechanism and 
vertical integration 
 
The Big Six energy firms are all vertically integrated as they have both electricity 
generation and electricity retailing activities. Together, they generate about 70% of total 
electricity generation in Great Britain (CMA, 2016). 19  The data about the proportion of 
renewable generation owned by vertically integrated firms is not available but we can 
generalise the current vertical market structure of UK electricity industry into two cases: the 
first is one generator to two suppliers, where one supplier is vertically integrated to the 
generator and another one is independent. The second case is two generators to two suppliers, 
where one generator and one supplier is vertically integrated as one firm against another 
independent generator and independent supplier. These two cases are shown in Figures 7 and 
8. 







  Figure 7: Case One: One Generator to Two Suppliers          Figure 8: Case Two: Two Generators to Two Suppliers 
                                                                               
In Case One, assume generator G1 has two strategies in pricing ROCs for supplier S1 
and S2: charge the higher price at point A for a higher transfer payment or charge the lower 
price at point B for a lower transfer payment in Figure 6. Apparently, charging the higher price 
is preferred by G1 because the transfer payment from integrated supplier S1 to G1 will not 
affect the profits of the integrated firm as a whole, but the transfer payment from independent 
supplier S2 to generator G1 affects the revenues of the integrated firm.  
In Case Two, when two generators are symmetric in terms of capacity and ROCs 
allocated, together with symmetric suppliers S1 (integrated) and S2 (independent) demand for 
ROCs, our analysis shows that the vertical integration between G1 and S1 promotes the 
upstream competition between G1 and G2, leading to a low price of ROCs and a lower transfer 
payment, as shown at point B in Figure 6. Here we use a numerical example to justify the claim 
above. By assuming that the number of ROCs allocated to each generator is 100, we start from 
an equilibrium that both integrated generator G1 and independent generator G2 charge a high 
                                                     

















price of ROC, as shown at point A in Figure 6. By further assuming a penalty rate of £20 on 
each ROC missed,  and a high price at £10 per ROC, G1 can receive £1,000 from its own 
supplier S1 (for 100 ROCs at the price of £10) as the internal transfer payment.20 At the high 
price, the independent generator G2 receives £1,000 (for 100 ROCs at the price of £10) from 
the independent supplier S2. This equilibrium is referred to as the H-H equilibrium in Table 1.  
 
 
 Independent Generator G2 
High price of ROCs (H) 
Independent Generator G2 










Low price of 
ROCs (L) 
  
Table 1: Equilibria in Case Two. G presents generator, S presents supplier, IF presents the vertical integration.  
 
To seek more gains from trading ROCs, G1 has an incentive to deviate from this H-H 
equilibrium. Suppose, G1 cuts the price of ROCs from £10 to £8, and G2 still charges a higher 
price at £10. In response to the lower price charged by G1, S2 intends to switch from G2 to G1.  
G1 can take the intention of S2 as an advantage to design a mixed strategy to seek more gains 
for the integrated firm. For example, G1 can offer 60 ROCs to S1 and 40 ROCs to S2, 
conditional on that S2 does not purchase any ROCs from G2. For S2, it pays £720 if it accepts 
the offer, as it makes a transfer payment of £320 to G1 (for 40 ROC at the price of £8), pays a 
penalty of £1,200 (for 60 missing ROCs at the buyout price of £20) and receives a recycle 
payment of £800 (40% of total penalty of £2,000). Otherwise, it still pays £1000 to G2 who 
charges each ROC at £10, so the offer is credible for S2 to accept. Meanwhile, G1 receives a 
total of £800 from selling ROCs, including the internal transfer payment of £480 from S1 (for 
60 ROCs at the price of £8) and the external transfer payment of £320 from S2. In addition, the 
loss to S1 is -£80, as it makes an internal transfer of £480 to G1, pays a penalty of £800 (for 40 
missing ROCs at the buyout price of £20) and receives a recycle payment of £1,200 (60% of 
total penalty of £2000). Therefore, as an integrated firm (IF), if it reduces the ROC price from 
£10 to £8, it receives a total net gain of £720, which comes from £800 received by G1 selling 
ROCs less the loss of £80 by S1 for purchase of ROCs. Apparently, £720 as the net gain of the 
integrated firm in the L-H is higher than the H-H case of £0, so G1 has the incentive to reduce 
the price of ROC. 
When the equilibrium moves from H-H to L-H, the transfer payment received by G2 
reduced from £1,000 to £0. To regain the transfer payment from S2, G2 needs to compete with 
                                                     
20 If assume the future marginal benefit is zero, our model in section 3 suggests that the ROC price is the half of 
the penalty.  




G1: 800, IF: 720  














G1 in lowering the ROC prices to £8, leading a new strategic equilibrium of the low price versus 
the low price, i.e., the L-L equilibrium in Table 1. At this equilibrium, G1 receives £800 from 
its own supplier S1 as the internal transfer of payment and the independent generator G2 
receives £800 from the independent supplier S2. This L-L equilibrium can be seen as point B 
in Figure 6. Therefore, the existence of vertical integration drives down the ROC price by 
encouraging upstream competition, leading to a lower transfer payments from suppliers. The 
process of moving from the H-H equilibrium to the L-L equilibrium can be presented as a 
movement from point A to point B in Figure 6.21  
However, point B may not be achieved when there is no integration between a generator 
and a supplier. Case Three with two independent generators and two independent suppliers is 
shown in Figure 9. In this case, independent suppliers can collude with each other in pursuing 
their common interest of minimising the transfer payment to generators. For example, of 100 
ROCs required for obligation, each supplier can present one ROC and pay a penalty for 99 
ROCs missed. Under the recycling mechanism, the equal share of the purchased ROCs can 
cancel out the penalty payment of each other. This extreme collusion strategy abuses the 
recycling mechanism to produce the worst case of almost zero transfer payment from suppliers 
to generators. Although our analysis of the Nash-Cournot strategy suggests that suppliers have 
the motivation to deviate from this arrangement for higher payoff in the short run, the benefits 







Figure 9: Case Three: Two Generators to Two Suppliers without integration 
The first remedy to the worst case of nearly zero transfer payment is the increasing 
competition in the electricity retail market. In the UK market, other than the six integrated large 
suppliers, there is an increasing number of independent suppliers, competing with each other 
in the ROC trading market. With a large number of independent suppliers, it becomes more 
difficult to prevent the deviation from the collusion strategy, which turns the Nash-Cournot 
strategy more favourable for suppliers to consider.  
Second, although the existence of vertical integration encourages upstream competition 
and reduces the transfer payment, it could prevent the worst case of nearly zero transfer 
payment. If there is an integrated firm as in Case Two, integrated supplier S1 and independent 
supplier S2 have different interests. The former takes the interest of the integrated firm into 
account by supporting the generator via the internal transfer payment, while the latter seeks to 
maximise its own profits. The different interests make two suppliers unlikely to collude with 
each other in setting up a joint strategy to abuse the recycling mechanism. Therefore, the 
integrated firm can prevent the worst case of nearly zero transfer payment.  
 
                                                     
21 Regarding the H-L equilibrium, G1 places its own S1 in a cost disadvantage for pricing electricity at the end-
users market when compared with independent S2 that has a lower cost of ROCs than S1. As a result, G1 will 













In this paper, we have constructed a theoretical model to show that the recycling 
mechanism in the Renewable Obligation scheme induces strategic behaviour between suppliers. 
Among multiple equilibria upon different ROC prices, the renewable generator would prefer a 
specific price to receive the maximum transfer payment and encourage suppliers to meet their 
obligation in full. Then we show that this maximum is lower than that in the scenario without 
the recycling mechanism, because the strategic behaviour induced reduces the transfer payment 
from suppliers to generators, weakening the aim of the Renewable Obligation scheme. Also, 
whether the maximum transfer payment can be achieved depends on the relative bargaining 
power between generators and suppliers. Our discussion on the behaviour of the vertically 
integrated firm supports the claim that the lower ROC price and transfer payment will be chosen 
under the recycling mechanism due to upstream competition between generators. But the 
existence of vertical integration prevents the collusion of suppliers in jointly abusing the 
recycling mechanism for choosing the least fulfilment of the obligation and the lowest transfer 
payment.  
In future research, we would like to follow up on a survey to find out how the practice 
aligns with the model. The information on the ROC price received by generators would help 
understand the distribution of financial support between suppliers and generators. Also, a 
survey from suppliers would help understand whether they have taken their competitors’ 
position into account when they decide the level of fulfilment. Furthermore, we would like to 
follow up on a cross-country study to have a better understanding of the impact of the recycling 
mechanism, which seems a unique design in the UK, while the quota system is also employed 
in other countries, such as United States, Australia, and Sweden.  
Our study has several limitations. First, there are only two identical suppliers in our 
theoretical model. A more complicated model involving multiple suppliers with different sizes 
would give additional conclusions. Secondly, the equilibrium solved by our model is based on 
the assumption of perfect information between suppliers in a static setting. As in reality, it is 
unlikely to know the competitor’s decision until the end of the reporting year, adding dynamic 
interactions and learning could bring interesting findings. Thirdly, it is not clear whether our 
arguments about vertical integration can still hold when the competition between vertically 
integrated firms is discussed. Therefore, if we can address these limits for our future research, 
it will be more insightful for understanding the market of the UK renewable electricity trade 
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Appendix: A list of variables 
 
𝜋𝑖 Supplier 𝑖’s profit 
𝑝𝑒 Retail electricity price 
𝑝𝑤 Wholesale electricity price 
𝑞𝑖 Annual supply of electricity by supplier 𝑖 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐 Price of ROC 
𝑅𝑖 Number of ROC presented by supplier 𝑖 
𝛼 Obligation level set by the regulator 
𝑄 Total supply of electricity by all suppliers 
𝑅 Total number of ROC presented by all suppliers 
𝑓 Buyout price per ROC missed 
𝑟 Recycle value awarded per ROC presented 
𝑟𝑛 Premium 
𝐸𝑖(𝑟) Expected recycle value 
𝑠𝑖 Marginal impact on future sales by presenting ROC 
𝑚 Profit margin 
𝑚𝑠𝑖 Future marginal benefit 
𝐸1(𝑅2) Supplier 1’s expectation of Supplier 2’s presented number of ROCs 
𝐸2(𝑅1) Supplier 2’s expectation of Supplier 1’s presented number of ROCs 
𝑅𝑒 Total number of ROC presented at equilibrium 
?̅? Total number of ROC allocated 
𝛽 Support level by the RO scheme 
𝑄𝑐 Estimated annual output by the renewable generator 
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Π𝑠 Renewable generator’s profit from selling electricity 
Π𝑟𝑜𝑐 Transfer payment received by the renewable generator from selling ROC 
𝑄𝑔 Quantity of electricity the renewable generator sold 
 
 
 
